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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edward Coss appeals from the denial of his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2254. 
He is not challenging the merits of the state conviction for 
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which he is presently incarcerated. Instead, he contends 
that because a former conviction for which he is no longer 
incarcerated or under any parole restraint was tainted by a 
constitutional infirmity, and that conviction was improperly 
considered when he was sentenced for his second offense, 
his current term of incarceration violates his constitutional 
rights. 
 
We must first decide whether the conviction of hisfirst 
offense was considered by the sentencing judge in the 
matter for which he is presently incarcerated, thereby 
vesting subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court for 
his present petition. If we find such jurisdiction we must 
then examine his first conviction to determine whether he 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent 
counsel. If we agree with this contention then we must 
decide what remedy is available to him. 
 
I. 
 
The melancholy chronicle of events started with a simple 
assault and battery that took place on June 25, 1986, in 
the small community of Dickson City in Lackawanna 
County, Pennsylvania, when the local police were called to 
a high school graduation party at the home of Carol Ann 
Frank, the sister of the then seventeen-year-old Appellant, 
Edward Coss. At the District Court hearing, testimony was 
presented that Appellant attended the party along with his 
brothers, Jimmy and Bobby, Appellant's girlfriend, Sherry 
Kulick, Carol Ann's roommate, Lisa Frieto, and Lisa's 
brother, George Frieto. Most of the guests at the party 
consumed alcohol.1 It seems that Carol Ann's roommate, 
Lisa Frieto, got into a hair pulling contest with Sherry 
Kulick, and thereafter the revelers, all of whom had been 
drinking, apparently picked sides and a grand donnybrook 
was had by all until Carol Ann, the hostess, threw everyone 
out of her house. 
 
Undeterred by the great outdoors, the donnybrookers 
continued their carousing outside until the landlord and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although at his trial Appellant's story differed from the facts we 
recount here, the District Court clearly credited this version of events. 
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the neighbors called the police. When the cops arrived with 
their usual greeting, "Break it up," there apparently was a 
slight problem in attitude adjustment, and the cops say 
that Appellant threw a couple of punches at one of them, 
landing himself in the local lockup. Totally dissatisfied with 
the accommodations, Appellant proceeded to voice his 
complaint by destroying a radiator, a sink, a toilet and a 
light fixture on the ceiling in his cell. For this, he was 
convicted of simple assault and institutional vandalism and 
sentenced to six months to a year on each offense. 
Appellant did his time and was released to society on 
parole. 
 
Appellant met with his assigned attorney, Rose Ann 
McGowan, on two occasions before his trial. The District 
Court made the finding of fact that Appellant gave 
McGowan the names and addresses of several potential 
witnesses during their first meeting.2  Counsel gave 
Appellant no notice of the trial date but contacted him 
approximately one hour before the trial was to begin, at 
which point Appellant drove directly to the courthouse, 
stopping only to pick up his brother Jimmy at school. 
 
Appellant's trial began on October 30, 1986 and lasted 
two days. At the trial, the officers who arrested Appellant, 
Officers Adamitis and Wrobel, testified that when they 
arrived at the scene, individuals began scattering and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Appellant testified at the evidentiary hearing that in the first 
meeting, 
he and McGowan discussed "the whole entire story, how it happened, 
[and] who was involved." His second andfinal meeting with McGowan 
prior to his trial occurred after a severance motion, requesting that the 
charges in connection with the simple assault be severed from those filed 
for the damage to the juvenile detention center, wasfiled in September 
1986. He alleges that he and McGowan also discussed the names of 
possible witnesses at this meeting. McGowan did not testify what 
occurred at these meetings. She did testify at the evidentiary hearing 
that Appellant did not give her the names of any witnesses he wanted 
her to subpoena, but then admitted that she did not specifically 
remember Appellant's case and was instead testifying based on her 
general practice as a public defender. 
 
The court also noted that even if Appellant did not provide the names 
to McGowan at this time, a cursory review of the police reports would 
have identified the names and addresses of some of these witnesses. 
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they grabbed Appellant as he was running to his car. They 
testified that Appellant was screaming vulgarities and 
smelled of alcohol. They testified that, after being grabbed, 
Appellant began pushing Officer Wrobel and was then 
arrested. They also testified that as Officer Adamitis 
attempted to grab Appellant's brother Bobby, Appellant 
punched Officer Adamitis in the face. This punch is the 
basis for Appellant's simple assault conviction. Finally, 
Officer Wrobel testified that an individual named George 
also hindered their attempts to arrest Bobby. 
 
The only witnesses to testify on Appellant's behalf were 
Appellant and Jimmy.3 Their accounts of the incident on 
June 25, 1986 were completely different from the testimony 
adduced some years later at the District Court hearing. 
They denied (1) that there was a party at Carol Ann's house 
that night and (2) that Appellant had been drinking. They 
testified (3) that on the night in question, Jimmy and 
Appellant were in their sister's driveway, along with their 
brother Bobby, and had been there no more than fifteen 
minutes when two police officers arrived and began to 
assault Bobby and Appellant, (4) that Appellant did not 
curse or punch anyone and (5) that he did not know who 
the officer was referring to when he stated that an 
individual named George was at the scene. Jimmy 
corroborated this story, stating that there was no party at 
Carol Ann's, that they were only at Carol Ann's house to 
give her a camera, that he had not been drinking and that 
Appellant did not hit a police officer. 
 
The charges ultimately presented to the jury were 
institutional vandalism and criminal mischief, simple 
assault, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. The jury 
convicted Appellant of institutional vandalism, criminal 
mischief and simple assault.4 Appellant was sentenced on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. McGowan did not suggest that Jimmy testify. Instead, Appellant, on 
his own initiative, brought Jimmy to the trial and asked him to testify. 
McGowan admitted that she did not subpoena, interview or prepare 
Jimmy. 
 
4. The institutional vandalism and criminal mischief result from 
Appellant's destruction of the detention cell and are not related to 
Appellant's interaction with the police outside of Carol Ann's house. 
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January 30, 1987, receiving six months to one year on the 
simple assault charge and six months to one year on the 
institutional vandalism and criminal mischief charges. The 
simple assault sentence ran consecutively to the 
institutional vandalism and criminal mischief sentence. As 
stated previously, Appellant has already served his 
sentence for these convictions. 
 
On August 30, 1989, seven or eight months after 
Appellant's discharge from Pennsylvania parole supervision, 
a certain Peter Petrovich was beaten "by a group of five or 
six men, including appellant."5 Appellant was subsequently 
arrested and convicted on one count of aggravated assault 
and battery and one count of simple assault for his part in 
the group effort to register displeasure on Petrovich's 
person. Appellant was sentenced to a term of six to twelve 
years imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction. 
Presently, he is serving a sentence based on charges from 
this 1990 conviction, unrelated to his 1986 convictions. 
Although he has served the term for the simple assault 
charge, Appellant urges that his claim is not moot because 
the assault charge was used to enhance his sentence from 
the 1990 conviction for which he is still incarcerated. 
 
II. 
 
On September 15, 1994, Appellant filed a pro se petition 
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to S 2254. Appellant 
filed an original and amended petition on November 29, 
1995, and a Second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on 
November 7, 1996. In the petition Appellant claimed that he 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel during the proceedings leading up to 
his 1986 convictions based on, among other things, 
counsel's failure to subpoena any of the witnesses he 
requested.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Commonwealth v. Coss, 695 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
 
6. Appellant also alleged that his counsel was ineffective for empaneling 
two jurors adverse to Appellant's interests, failing to have the 
institutional vandalism and criminal mischief charges dismissed and 
failing to file post-trial motions. The District Court dismissed these 
other 
bases of ineffective counsel and, see infra Section V, Appellant does not 
appeal their dismissal. 
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On April 20, 1998, an evidentiary hearing was held to 
address Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
At the hearing, each of the witnesses that Appellant stated 
he had identified to counsel, namely, Carol Ann, Bobby, 
Sherry, and George, testified that McGowan did not contact 
them regarding Edward's trial and that he did not strike 
any police officer. Bobby, Sherry, and George testified that 
there was a party and Edward was present, that someone 
had called the police and that the first thing that the police 
did upon arrival was approach Edward and place him in 
the back of one of the police cars. They testified that the 
police then chased after Bobby, at which point George 
jumped on the back of one of the officers to try to hinder 
his attempt to arrest Bobby. Thus, according to these 
witnesses' testimony, Appellant was in the police car the 
entire time the police attempted to arrest Bobby. According 
to the District Court, "McGowan's recollection of the case 
[at the evidentiary hearing] was somewhat sketchy."7 She 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. From a review of the evidentiary hearing transcript, we agree with the 
District Court's characterization of McGowan's memory of this case. At 
the evidentiary hearing, McGowan testified: 
 
        Q. Ms. McGowan, is your testimony, today, base d on actual 
       recollection of this particular case, the Coss case, or are you 
       testifying, based upon your general practice, as a Public Defender, 
       when you were employed in the Public Defender's Office? 
 
        A. It would--it would be in part, yes, and i n part, no. Because 
       certain portions that I've responded to, I have direct 
recollection. As 
       I said, I have direct recollection--once I looked at the sentencing 
       report, I had direct recollection, exactly, what had transpired. I 
       mean, once Mr. Coss told Judge Cottone, according to the 
       transcript, that he was thinking about an appeal, but they were 
       telling him this, and then I just--I recalled. I do recall 
distinctly, 
       exactly, that they--the they . . was advising him this way, and he 
       would not listen to me, okay? When we wanted tofile the Post-trial 
       Motions on that, he did not want them. . . . That is direct 
       recollection. Now, the other stuff may be general. 
 
       . . . . 
 
        Q. Ms. McGowan, what I'm asking you about is, do you, 
       specifically, remember having this conversation with Eddie Coss 
       about these witnesses or is your testimony that this is how you 
       normally conduct yourself? 
 
                                7 
  
conceded during the hearing that she did not investigate 
the events surrounding Coss' arrest, electing not to 
dispatch her investigator to interview any of the witnesses 
at issue, and defended her actions by stating that"Coss 
must have told her not to subpoena them." Dist. Ct. Op. at 
16 (June 10, 1998). 
 
Following the hearing, the District Court denied 
Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The 
court held that, although McGowan's failure to subpoena 
these witnesses "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness," Appellant failed to prove that he was 
prejudiced by McGowan's failure because the verdict would 
not have been different, given the inconsistency in the 
accounts of Appellant and his brother on the one hand, and 
the witnesses and the police on the other. Appellant 
appeals this decision of the District Court, arguing on 
appeal that the District Court erred in its application of the 
prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test 
as stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
III. 
 
Our first inquiry is whether the sentencing court at the 
1990 conviction took into consideration the 1986 
conviction. The presentence report of the Lackawanna Adult 
Probation Office indicated that Appellant had been 
convicted on January 30, 1987 of Institutional Vandalism, 
Criminal Mischief and Simple Assault and was sentenced 
"[o]n the charge of Simple Assault 6 months to 1 years plus 
costs, consecutive to the Institutional Vandalism sentence." 
Pl.'s Ex. 5 at 5. On March 26, 1996, Appellant's counsel 
raised the question whether Appellant's 1986 convictions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        A. No, no. No, no, no, it wouldn't be. I would  have asked him 
       what about these people, what about these, what about these? You 
       know, what were they doing there or how are they related to this? 
 
The questioning continued with McGowan answering the questions 
regarding her failure to subpoena the witnesses in the form of what she 
"would have" done or what Coss "must have" said, as distinguished from 
stating what she "did" or what Coss "said." 
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should count as one misdemeanor, rather than two. Pl.'s 
Ex. 2 at 5. A Mr. Mecca, ostensibly from the probation 
office, commented: 
 
       To state that when the defendant committed a simple 
       assault in Dickson City was at that time petitioned, 
       charged, placed in juvenile detention, and the following 
       day in Scranton, Pennsylvania, decided or was charged 
       with institutional vandalism, destroying the cell he was 
       in, to say that is one and the same act as a simple 
       assault, which was followed by hours, if not a day of no 
       criminal activity, to say that is one under the 
       guidelines is an error, Judge." 
 
Id. at 9. 
 
At a continuation of the hearing the next day the judge 
ruled that he "will view these as being one transaction, one 
incident, one conviction, rather than two. Therefore, I will 
be viewing the defendant with a prior record score of two 
rather than three." Pl.'s Ex. 3 at 5. On April 28, 1993, the 
judge stated that in determining the sentence "we've taken 
into consideration your presentence investigation, the 
report . . . [and] your prior record . . . ." Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 6. 
 
We are satisfied that the sentencing judge for the 1990 
conviction took into consideration Appellant's simple 
assault conviction stemming from the events of June 25, 
1986. 
 
IV. 
 
We must now decide whether the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas petition. 
Section 2254 confers jurisdiction on United States District 
Courts to entertain petitions for habeas corpus relief only 
from persons who are "in custody" in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted S 2254 as mandating that 
the petitioner be "in custody" pursuant to the conviction or 
sentence he seeks to attack at the time his petition is filed. 
See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). A habeas 
petitioner does not remain "in custody" under a conviction 
"after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely 
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because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be 
used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent 
crimes of which he is convicted." Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 
488, 492 (1989) (per curiam). A petitioner does, however, 
satisfy the "in custody" requirement for federal habeas 
jurisdiction when he asserts a challenge to a sentence he is 
currently serving that has been enhanced by the allegedly 
invalid prior conviction. Id. at 493. Moreover, in United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the Court held that 
a prisoner could attack in a federal habeas proceeding an 
allegedly unconstitutional conviction, even if he has served 
in entirety the sentence resulting from the conviction, if 
that conviction had an effect on a present sentence. See 
also Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(holding that "a prisoner may attack his current sentence 
by a habeas challenge to the constitutionality of an expired 
conviction if that conviction was used to enhance his 
current sentence"). 
 
Although Appellant has already served the sentence 
resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional 1986 
convictions and is currently serving a sentence for an 
unrelated conviction that occurred in 1990, he contends 
that the sentence from his 1990 conviction was adversely 
affected by the 1986 simple assault conviction. We have 
concluded that the sentencing judge did, in fact, refer to 
Appellant's 1986 conviction for assaulting a police officer in 
sentencing him for his 1990 conviction. Appellant is thus 
attacking his prior conviction in an attempt to have his 
current sentence, which relied on his prior conviction, 
reevaluated. The District Court therefore appropriately 
construed Appellant's petition as challenging the 1990 
conviction rather than his expired conviction, see Young v. 
Vaughn, 83 F.3d at 75, and properly concluded that it had 
jurisdiction over his S 2254 petition. Id.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. 
 
V. 
 
Absent a valid excuse, a habeas petitioner must present 
all federal claims to the state courts. 28 U.S.C.S 2254(b); 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). "The exhaustion 
requirement ensures that state courts have the first 
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opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to 
state convictions and preserves the role of the state courts 
in protecting federally guaranteed rights." Evans v. Court of 
Common Pleas, Delaware County, Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1230 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing O'Halloran v. Ryan, 835 F.2d 506, 509 
(3d Cir. 1987)). Of course, "[i]nexcusable or inordinate delay 
by the state in processing claims for relief may render the 
state remedy effectively unavailable" and exhaustion will be 
excused. Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
 
Prior to filing his S 2254 petition, Appellant had a petition 
challenging his 1986 conviction pending under 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 9541, et seq. (amended 1988), for 
approximately seven years without any activity. Under 
these circumstances, the District Court excused the 
exhaustion requirement and we find no fault with that 
decision. Appellant has not, however, presented to the 
Pennsylvania state courts his claim that the invalid 1986 
conviction was used to enhance his subsequent conviction 
in 1990, the conviction being challenged by the underlying 
habeas petition. Nonetheless, we conclude that this is not 
a situation in which the District Court was faced with a 
mixed petition necessitating a dismissal under Rose v. 
Lundy. As was made clear by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 699 A.2d 
718 (1997), collateral relief is not available under either the 
Post Conviction Hearing Act or under the common law 
remedies of state habeas corpus or coram nobis for a 
petitioner who is not currently serving a sentence of 
imprisonment for the conviction he wishes to challenge, 
even if petitioner contends that collateral consequences 
stem from that conviction. Accordingly, insofar as state law 
clearly forecloses state court review of Appellant's"collateral 
consequence" claim, the District Court properly excused 
exhaustion and entertained the claim on its merit. 8 See, 
e.g., Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We view Commonwealth v. Ahlborn not as erecting a "procedural bar," 
but as a statement that there is no available state remedy for the claim 
that the present sentence was incorrectly enhanced by an invalid prior 
conviction." 
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1986) (citing Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) 
(per curiam)). 
 
VI. 
 
Because Appellant submitted filings to the District Court 
both before and after the enactment of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), we 
think it necessary to briefly discuss the law governing this 
action. We conclude that the amendments brought about 
by AEDPA do not apply to this case as Appellant's original 
petition and amendment were both filed prior to AEDPA's 
effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); 
McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997). Though 
Appellant did file a "Second Petition" in November of 1996, 
i.e., after the enactment of AEDPA, that petition did not add 
new claims, but merely waived, as was permitted by the 
District Court's order of October 23, 1996, those claims 
presented in his original petition that were determined by 
the District Court to be unexhausted. See Rose , 455 U.S. at 
510 (petitioner may amend his petition to delete 
unexhausted claims); McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 
941 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). In fairness, we view Appellant's 
"Second Petition" filed after AEDPA as tantamount to a 
further amendment or clarification to his initial petition, 
filed at the direction of the District Court, which merely 
expressed Appellant's intention to proceed with his 
exhausted claims. Therefore, we consider all the claims 
raised as having been asserted in a petition filed prior to 
AEDPA's enactment date. See also United States v. Duffus, 
174 F.3d 333, 336-337 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing, inter 
alia, the "relation back" provision of Rule 15(c), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and its application to clarifying 
amendments to habeas petitions). Accordingly, pre-AEDPA 
requirements govern. Appellant was obligated to obtain a 
certificate of probable cause in order to appeal from the 
District Court's judgment dismissing his habeas corpus 
petition. 
 
The pre-AEDPA certificate of probable cause did not 
require specification of issues and placed the entire case 
before the court of appeals. See Ramsey v. Bowersox, 149 
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F.3d 749, 759 (8th Cir. 1998); Herrera v. United States, 96 
F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States ex 
rel. Hickey v. Jeffes, 571 F.2d 762, 765-766 (3d Cir. 1978). 
By contrast, the post-AEDPA certificate of appealability 
requires specification as to which issues satisfy the 
standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2), i.e., those 
issues for which the applicant has made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. In the 
instant case, rather than granting Appellant a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal, the District Court granted 
Appellant a certificate of appealability limited to his claim 
that counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance 
by failing to subpoena witnesses on the simple assault 
charge. Under pre-AEDPA law we determined that it is 
inappropriate for a District Court to prescribe the issues or 
issue which may be considered in support of or in 
opposition to a judgment and that Appellant is free to 
choose which claims to assert on appeal. Hickey , 571 F.2d 
at 766. Because Appellant, through his attorney, limited his 
request for a certificate on appeal to the one issue he 
believed to be of "arguable merit," that is, the 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim at issue, we see no reason 
to extend our review beyond the merits of that claim. 
Moreover, given our disposition of the appeal, we believe 
that an expanded review would make little difference. 
 
VII. 
 
We now reach the merits of Appellant's Sixth Amendment 
claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. 
Because his contention involves the legal component of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we exercise plenary 
review. Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
To obtain relief based on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a petitioner must not only show that his 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, but 
also that it prejudiced his case. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. at 692. The District Court determined that his 
counsel's failure to subpoena the witnesses at issue was 
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objectively unreasonable, but denied relief because 
Appellant had failed to demonstrate prejudice.9 
 
To prove prejudice under the second prong of the 
Strickland test, a defendant must "establish a reasonable 
probability--one sufficient to undermine our confidence in 
the outcome--that the jury's verdict would have been 
different if not for counsel's errors." United States v. Gray, 
878 F.2d 702, 712 (3d Cir. 1989). The District Court 
reached its conclusion that Appellant had failed to 
demonstrate prejudice because the witnesses who testified 
at the evidentiary hearing painted a completely different 
picture of the incident leading to Appellant's arrest from 
that told by Appellant and his brother, Jimmy, at trial. The 
evidentiary hearing testimony made clear that on the night 
of the incident Appellant had been drinking at a party that 
had to be broken up by the police. This version of events is 
a far cry from Appellant's trial testimony of a calm, quiet 
visit by him and his brother sabotaged by two rogue police 
officers. Assuming that Appellant still would have testified 
and would have testified in the way that he did, the District 
Court reasoned that the failure to call these witnesses was 
not prejudicial to Appellant. It reasoned that their 
testimony, if offered, would only have suggested to the jury 
that Appellant was lying on the witness stand and that 
Appellant was drunk and excitable during the incident. 
Because this case turned on a credibility determination 
between Appellant and the officers, the District Court 
reasoned that Appellant could not have been prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to call witnesses who only would have 
contradicted Appellant's version of the facts, destroying his 
credibility with the jury.10 The District Court thus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We are not asked to review the issue of the reasonableness of 
counsel's actions as justifiable or strategic decisions. Appellant's 
attorney claimed no tactical merit to her failures except to say that she 
must have done what Appellant wanted in not subpoenaing witnesses; 
nor does the Commonwealth contest the District Court's finding that her 
conduct "fell below objective standards of reasonableness." 
10. The District Court also considered that Carol Ann and Bobby's 
testimony would have been suspect since they are Coss' siblings, that 
Sherry's testimony would have been suspect since she was Coss' 
girlfriend, and that George Frieto's testimony, while seemingly beneficial 
to Appellant in that he testified that it was he who attacked the officer, 
is also not inconsistent with the officer's testimony that an individual 
named George, in addition to Appellant, tried to hinder Bobby's arrest. 
 
                                14 
  
concluded that the outcome of the trial would have been no 
different, that is, Appellant still would have been found 
guilty of assaulting the officer, absent counsel's failure to 
summon the other witnesses. 
 
We disagree with the District Court. Although it is 
unlikely that a court can determine with certainty the 
result of the proceedings absent counsel's failure, we must 
examine the "breadth of the evidence" and determine 
whether the case would have come out the way that it did 
if the witnesses had been present. United States v. 
Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 1997). Having 
examined the evidence in this case, including the 
evidentiary hearing transcript, we conclude that a 
reasonable probability exists that had counsel subpoenaed 
the witnesses, Appellant would not have been found guilty 
of assaulting the officer. 
 
As a result of counsel's failure to conduct an 
investigation into the events surrounding Appellant's arrest, 
only Appellant and his younger brother Jimmy testified in 
his defense. There can be little doubt that Appellant and 
Jimmy decided to try to conceal the fact that they had been 
drinking that evening because they were both underage. 
Regardless of Appellant's motivation to lie about the context 
of the incident provoking his arrest, however, both he and 
Jimmy testified that Appellant did not assault a police 
officer. At the evidentiary hearing held to investigate 
Appellant's ineffective counsel claims, Carol Ann, Bobby, 
Sherry and George all testified that there was a party at 
Carol Ann's house, that the people at the party were 
consuming alcohol, that a fight broke out, and that the 
police came to break it up. Most important, they all testified 
consistently that Appellant did not punch a police officer. 
Bobby, Sherry and George testified consistently that it was 
George who jumped on a police officer's back when the 
officer assaulted Bobby. Finally, they testified consistently 
that, at the time the officers arrested Bobby, which 
according to the officers is the time that Appellant punched 
the officer, Appellant was sitting in the police car with the 
door shut.11 Thus, although the witnesses' rendition of what 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. It is important to note that all witnesses at the evidentiary hearing 
were sequestered, thus bolstering the credibility of these witnesses' 
convincingly consistent versions of the critical events. 
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happened on the night in question conflicts in large part 
with Appellant's version at his trial, all accounts of the 
evening are consistent in their most significant respect-- 
Appellant did not commit the assault alleged. 
 
We believe that the District Court employed too narrow 
an approach in analyzing Appellant's claim of prejudice. 
When it reached the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, 
the District Court stated that " `[p]rejudice' to a defendant 
from the failure to call witnesses should be assessed in the 
context of the other testimony presented by the defense 
witnesses." Dist. Ct. Op. at 18 (June 10, 1998) (emphasis 
added). The District Court phrased as the critical question: 
would the result of the trial have been any different if, 
instead of only Appellant and Jimmy testifying, the other 
four witnesses had also testified in Coss' defense? In so 
framing this question, the court assumed not only that 
Appellant would still have testified on his own behalf, but 
also that he would have told the same tale that he did at 
trial. 
 
Strickland teaches that a court consider"the totality of 
the evidence before the judge or jury" in determining 
prejudice. 466 U.S. at 695. "Some errors will have had a 
pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some 
will have had an isolated, trivial effect." Id. at 695-696. 
 
Here, counsel's error had a pervasive effect, altering the 
entire evidentiary picture at trial. The testimony of the 
witnesses not presented should not be considered as merely 
a hypothetical supplement to the evidence actually offered 
at trial, with the remainder of the trial presumed to unfold 
as it actually did. Considering the totality of the evidence, 
we believe that, had counsel subpoenaed the witnesses and 
heard from them their version of the events (including that, 
although the police were correct in their allegations, it was 
George, not Appellant, who assaulted the officer), she would 
not have presented at trial all versions of the evening's 
events, including Coss' clearly fictional rendition. When we 
assume the reasonably probable outcome without counsel's 
ineffectiveness, we must also assume a scenario that 
envisions counsel's acting effectively.12  The District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As pointed out by Appellant, if counsel had put both Appellant and 
the witnesses at issue on the stand and presented an inconsistent theory 
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should have realized and considered the different course 
that the trial would probably have taken had counsel acted 
in an objectively reasonable manner by subpoenaing and 
interviewing these witnesses, and then presenting a defense 
consistent with their testimony. Had counsel interviewed 
these witnesses, we believe that there is a reasonable 
probability that Appellant would not have testified at all, or 
that he would have testified consistently with the other 
witnesses, thus avoiding the contradictory testimony that 
troubled the District Court. 
 
As the Court has emphasized, the prejudice inquiry also 
involves concepts of reliability and fairness. See Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). We believe that 
counsel's failure to subpoena these witnesses was 
prejudicial. They would have testified as to Appellant's 
innocence to the simple assault charge. This strongly 
suggests that the outcome of the trial would not have been 
the same. In light of the quantity of exculpatory evidence 
that was available yet not presented to the jury, we believe 
counsel's conduct made the result of the trial 
fundamentally unfair and unreliable. Appellant has thus 
met his burden under Strickland to prove that he was 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to subpoena the 
witnesses at issue. 
 
We, therefore, conclude that the District Court erred in 
denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
VIII. 
 
Finally, we must address what relief is appropriate. It has 
been suggested that, inasmuch as Appellant has already 
served his sentence under the tainted proceeding, the only 
relief available is to direct the Commonwealth to re- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of defense, that in itself could constitute ineffective assistance. See 
Bland 
v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir. 1994). Of 
course, counsel cannot rely on Bland to say that it was proper for her to 
not offer the witnesses' testimony in her attempt to present a consistent 
theory of defense, because she did not interview these witnesses to 
ascertain any inconsistencies. 
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sentence Appellant for the 1990 conviction without any 
reference to the previous assault and battery conviction. 
 
The normal relief that we grant in habeas corpus is to 
order that the habeas petitioner be freed, subject to the 
right of society to correct in a timely manner the 
constitutional error through a new state proceeding. It 
cannot be controverted that had Appellant filed his habeas 
petition during the period he was incarcerated or on parole 
from the first conviction and we decided that he had been 
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, we 
would have accorded Pennsylvania the option of releasing 
him or correcting the infirmity by means of a new trial or 
other proceeding. See, e.g., Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 
159 (3d Cir. 1998); Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
Here, however, we cannot "free" Appellant because he has 
already, in the vernacular, "done the crime and done the 
time." We are thus faced with the very nice question: 
Should we give society, here, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the right to cure the Sixth Amendment 
constitutional defect or should we give the Appellant a free 
ride and have his second sentence declared invalid simply 
because he is a recidivist? In Henderson, we explained that 
"federal habeas power is limited, first, to a determination of 
whether there has been an improper detention by virtue of 
the state court judgment; and second, if we find such an 
illegal detention, to ordering the immediate release of the 
prisoner, conditioned on the state's opportunity to correct 
constitutional errors that we conclude occurred in the 
initial proceedings." 155 F.3d at 168. 
 
Appellant contends that where a previously infirm 
conviction has been used to enhance the sentence in a 
subsequent criminal case, the only remedy available to a 
federal court is to require the state to re-sentence under the 
second conviction and deny it the opportunity to correct the 
constitutional infirmity in the previous case. He relies on a 
series of cases which we now examine. 
 
Appellant's primary reliance is on the teachings of United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). We do not deem this 
to be an appropriate analogue to this case or any other 
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federal habeas case brought under S 2254. By caption and 
by content United States v. Tucker was not a habeas corpus 
case brought under S 2254 based on a state conviction. 
There the defendant was seeking post conviction relief from 
a federal conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2255. This is 
a distinction with a fundamental difference. The Court 
could not possibly condition relief on affording any state the 
opportunity to retry the defendant because no state officials 
were parties to the lawsuit. No state wardens, custodians or 
state officers were respondents or defendants as in the case 
of a S 2254 petition. In bringing his action, Tucker was 
attacking a federal sentence imposed by the District Court 
for the Northern District of California that had been 
enhanced on the basis of invalid state court convictions 
from Florida and Louisiana. Because the Court had no 
state officers as petitioners or respondents before it, the 
Court lacked power or authority to give the option to a state 
court in Florida or Louisiana to retry the defendant. To 
prevent the "erosion of the Gideon principle" that the right 
to effective assistance of counsel is fundamental, the Court 
had no alternative other than to order that the defendant 
be re-sentenced on the federal conviction without reference 
to the invalid state court convictions.13  In contrast, in every 
habeas petition brought under S 2254, an officer of the 
state or a political subdivision thereof is always the 
respondent. The teachings of Tucker reflect one exception to 
the general rule of permitting the state to correct the 
constitutional infirmity in a subsequent sentence 
enhancement case--where the federal court lacks the 
authority to afford the state the opportunity to correct the 
constitutional infirmity because no state officer is a party to 
the litigation. We now turn to other exceptions reflected in 
the cases. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Court's discussion is specifically targeted to a S 2255 case: 
 
       [T]he real question here is not whether the results of the Florida 
and 
       Louisiana proceedings might have been different if the respondent 
       had had counsel, but whether the sentence in the 1953 federal case 
       might have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at 
       least two of the respondent's previous convictions had been 
       unconstitutionally obtained. 
 
404 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). 
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This court has held that where a return to the state for 
additional proceedings "would be virtually impossible" 
under the circumstances, the federal court in aS 2254 case 
may simply order re-sentencing on the subsequent 
conviction without affording the state an opportunity to 
cure the previous constitutionally infirm conviction. See 
Clark v. Commonwealth, 892 F.2d 1142 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Clark was a deprivation of due process case lodged against 
a prior conviction that served to enhance the sentence for 
a subsequent offense. The gravamen of the petitioner's 
complaint was that in 1974, when Clark was 17 years of 
age, he was denied a juvenile court hearing to determine 
whether he should have been tried as a juvenile or as an 
adult. We determined that this denial constituted a due 
process violation, reversed the district court and granted 
relief, and, without elaboration at this point in the opinion, 
ordered that "the matter must be remanded for re- 
sentencing on the 1979 conviction without consideration of 
the prior offenses." 892 F.2d at 1153. Nevertheless, earlier 
in our opinion, recognizing that at the time we heard this 
appeal in 1989, the petitioner was 31 years old, there is a 
statement of reasons supporting our determination of the 
proper relief. Although set forth in our discussion of a 
portion of the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Hearing Act, we 
commented that "both the delay, 16 years since the alleged 
due process violation, and the prejudice . . . are present. 
. . . Given the death of the trial judge and the destruction 
of the relevant stenographic notes, to now defend against 
this issue in a collateral proceeding would be virtually 
impossible. . . . To return to the Pennsylvania courts would 
thus be futile." 892 F.2d at 1148-1149. Moreover, before us 
and in the district court the Commonwealth gave no 
indication that it wished to pursue further proceedings in 
the constitutionally infirm 1974 prosecution. The only relief 
possible was to order a re-sentencing on the subsequent 
conviction without enhancement. Thus, Clark reflects a 
second exception to the general rule permitting the state to 
exercise the option of additional proceedings. 
 
In addition, a defendant could not be retried by the state 
where the trial never should have been held because of a 
serious constitutional violation such as denial of a right to 
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a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). 
Barker teaches that: 
 
       [T]he [speedy trial] right also leads to the 
       unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the 
       indictment when the right has been deprived. This is 
       indeed a serious consequence because it means that a 
       defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go 
       free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more 
       serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a 
       new trial, but it is the only possible remedy . 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court also teaches that dismissal 
is the only remedy for violation of the double jeopardy 
principle. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-796 
(1969), the Court remarked: 
 
       [T]he State with all its resources and power should not 
       be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
       individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
       him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
       compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
       and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility 
       that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
 
Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 
(1957)). 
 
An example of a double jeopardy problem would arise if 
a petitioner were successful in a case like Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson , the petitioner 
claimed in a habeas corpus proceeding that he had been 
convicted on constitutionally inadequate evidence. The 
Court held that the petition would be granted if"upon the 
record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. at 324. Had the petition been granted in that case, the 
state could not retry the petitioner because it would violate 
his right against double jeopardy. See also Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause 
forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the 
prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which 
it failed to muster in the first proceeding. This is central to 
the objective of the prohibition against successive trials."). 
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Another situation where a defendant cannot be retried is 
when a writ is granted because the state denied the 
petitioner due process of law by suppressing or destroying 
exculpatory evidence that no longer can be reconstructed. 
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). If the 
prosecution were to not only withhold exculpatory evidence 
in violation of Brady, but also destroy it, a defendant could 
never receive a fair trial. The defendant could never 
produce the totality of the evidence in his or her defense 
because of the constitutional violations. In this instance, 
the only constitutional remedy would be unconditional 
granting of the writ. 
 
There is no parallel between the case at bar and those 
cases where courts have determined that states should not 
be entitled to retry the petitioner. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Therefore, we will condition the entry of the writ by 
extending to the Commonwealth the option of conducting a 
new trial. If this new trial produces a verdict different from 
the prior verdict, the state must re-sentence Appellant to 
account for any enhancement due to this guilty verdict.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Even if the Commonwealth elects to retry Coss, he will have to be re- 
sentenced regardless of the outcome. Even if a valid conviction is 
forthcoming on the earlier charge, nothing changes the fact that his 
current sentence was enhanced by an unconstitutional violation. A 
vacated conviction is not the same conviction as one that occurs after 
vacatur. Thus, in the event of a valid conviction, he would still have to 
be re-sentenced on the subsequent offense in light of new proceedings on 
the earlier offense. 
 
We hold only that a retrial on the earlier offense would not violate the 
Federal Constitution and that comity requires us to afford the 
Commonwealth the opportunity to cure the original constitutional defect. 
We express no opinion on whether such a retrial would be consistent 
with Pennsylvania law. Moreover, if there is a conviction on retrial of 
the 
earlier offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that the time he 
has already served on the original 1990 sentence be credited against the 
new sentence. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-719 (1969) 
("If, upon a new trial, the defendant is acquitted, there is no way the 
years he spent in prison can be returned to him. But if he is reconvicted, 
these years can and must be returned--by subtracting them from 
whatever sentence is imposed."), overruled on other grounds by Alabama 
v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
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The Commonwealth also has the option of not affording a 
new trial and merely proceeding into re-sentencing on the 
1990 conviction. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court that denied the petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions that 
it issue a writ of habeas corpus conditioned on the 
foregoing options available to the Commonwealth. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I agree with much of the majority's opinion. Indeed, I 
agree that Coss was denied effective assistance of counsel 
during his 1986 trial for simple assault, and that his 
subsequent conviction on that charge is constitutionally 
infirm as a result. I part company with the majority over 
the question of whether the challenged sentence"might 
have been different if the sentencing judge had known that 
at least [some] of the respondent's prior convictions had 
been unconstitutionally obtained." United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972). On this record, I have no doubt 
that the sentencing judge would have imposed exactly the 
same sentence had he known Coss' 1986 conviction for 
simple assault was constitutionally infirm. Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority's 
opinion holding that Coss is entitled to habeas relief. 
Because I conclude that no relief is due, I express no view 
on the propriety of the majority's remedy. 
 
This is at least the third time that Coss has asked a 
court to review the sentence arising from his 1990 
conviction for simple and aggravated assault. Thefirst time, 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court "vacated the sentence 
because it was not clear that the presentence report was 
accurate" and remanded the case for resentencing. See 
Commonwealth v. Coss, 695 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa. Super. 
1997) (mem) (citing Commonwealth v. Coss, 674 A.2d 313 
(Pa. Super. 1996)). 
 
At his resentencing hearing, Coss challenged both the 
gravity assigned to his aggravated assault conviction, and 
its enhancement based on his criminal record. See id. The 
sentencing court agreed that his three misdemeanor 
convictions in 1986 all arose from the same action and, 
accordingly, reduced his prior record score from 3 to 2. See 
id. The effect of the adjustment was to eliminate the 1986 
convictions from Coss' prior record score entirely. The post- 
adjustment score of 2 was based solely on Coss' 1985 
adjudication of delinquency. See id. at 835. Despite making 
the adjustment, however, the court resentenced Coss to the 
same six-to-twelve-year sentence it had originally imposed. 
That sentence remained within the standard range provided 
by the state sentencing guidelines even after the prior 
 
                                24 
  
record adjustment, and the court found no reason for a 
downward departure. See id. at 833-34. 
 
In resentencing Coss to the same sentence it had 
originally imposed, the sentencing court considered a 
number of different factors. In explaining the sentence for 
the record, the court informed Coss that: 
 
       in passing sentence on you I've taken into 
       consideration the presentence investigation report, and 
       I've deleted therefrom all the remarks through the 
       matter brought to my attention by [defense counsel] 
       and I will not consider those matters. 
 
        I've taken into consideration the statements by 
       [defense counsel] and the seriousness and nature of 
       the crime involved here, the well being and protection 
       of the people who live in our community, your prior 
       criminal record, the possibility of your rehabilitation, 
       and the testimony that I've heard. I was the trial judge, 
       and I take into consideration the testimony from the 
       trial. 
 
Sentencing Transcript of 03/27/1996 at 4-5, reproduced in 
Supp. App. at 243-44. 
 
I would not deny Coss the relief he seeks merely because 
his prior criminal record was only one of many factors on 
which the sentencing court based its decision. Instead, I 
would deny relief because his 1986 simple assault 
conviction is such a minor component of that record that 
there is no question that the sentencing court, given its 
concerns, would have imposed exactly the same sentence in 
any event. 
 
Given the nature of Coss' appeal, it is certainly 
understandable that the focus of attention has been on the 
challenged 1986 conviction for simple assault. But I take a 
broader view and include the extensive criminal record that 
Coss has managed to compile. It starts with a 1980 arrest, 
when Coss was 11 years old, for recklessly endangering 
another person. See Presentence Investigation Report at 4, 
reproduced in Supp. App. at 258. Thereafter, Coss was 
adjudicated delinquent on five separate occasions (when he 
was 12, 13, 15 and 16 years old) for, respectively: (1) theft 
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and receiving stolen property; (2) disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest; (3) simple assault; (4) yet another simple 
assault; and (5) burglary. See id. 
 
As an adult, Coss has been convicted on the aggravated 
and simple assault charges for which he is currently 
imprisoned. In separate incidents, he has pleaded guilty to 
disorderly conduct after being charged with that offense, as 
well as with hindering apprehension, in 1989. He also 
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in 
1992 after being charged with that offense, and with 
reckless endangerment in 1991. 
 
In addition, Coss' record at the time of sentencing  
included:1 
 
(1) a 1986 arrest for making terroristic threats; 
 
(2) a 1988 arrest for aggravated assault and simple 
       assault; 
 
(3) a 1988 arrest for delivery of a controlled substance 
       (heroin); 
 
(4) a 1989 arrest for aggravated assault, simple assault, 
       recklessly endangering another person and disorderly 
       conduct; 
 
(5) another 1989 arrest for aggravated and simple assault; 
 
(6) yet another 1989 arrest for simple assault as well as 
       for making terroristic threats; 
 
(7) a 1990 arrest for simple assault and retail theft; and 
 
(8) a 1990 arrest for retail theft and criminal conspiracy; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under Pennsylvania law, a sentencing court may consider prior 
arrests in an offender's record, that did not result in convictions, "so 
long as the court realizes that the defendant had not been convicted on 
those prior charges," and does not give them"undue weight." See 
Commonwealth v. Craft, 450 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Straw, 361 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. 1976); Commonwealth 
v. Tisdale, 334 A.2d 722 (Pa. Super. 1975); Commonwealth v. 
Shoemaker, 313 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. 1973), aff 'd 341 A.2d 111 (1975)); 
see also Commonwealth v. Allen, 489 A.2d 906, 912 n.4 (Pa. Super. 
1985). 
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See id. at 5-7. 
 
The 1996 sentencing court was intimately familiar with 
Coss, with the charges on which he had been convicted, 
and with his criminal record. It had the opportunity to hear 
the evidence against Coss at trial. It had the opportunity to 
hear from Coss at sentencing. See Sentencing Transcript of 
04/28/1993 at 4-5, reproduced in Supp. App. at 199-200. 
Most importantly, it had the relatively rare opportunity to 
reconsider its decision when the original sentence was 
vacated on appeal. Yet, the court chose to impose the same 
sentence it had initially imposed, finding "no reason" for a 
reduction. See Sentencing Transcript of 03/27/1996 at 26, 
reproduced in Supp. App. at 244. 
 
In finding no reason to reduce Coss' sentence, the court 
found it "indicative from [Coss'] actions" that he would 
"continue to break the law." Id. Given the extensive and 
often violent nature of Coss' criminal record, Ifind it 
impossible to conclude that the sentencing court's concerns 
for "the well being of the people who live in our community" 
and the "possibility for [Coss'] rehabilitation" would have 
been allayed by the omission of his 1986 conviction for 
simple assault from his criminal record. Because I am 
certain that the sentencing court would not have sentenced 
Coss differently had it known that one conviction was 
constitutionally infirm, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority's conclusion to the contrary. 
 
Judge Roth joins in this dissenting opinion. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
 
I concur with the reasoning and result of the majority 
opinion in all respects except its discussion of the relief to 
be afforded to Eddie Coss as set forth at Part VIII. I believe 
that Part VIII of the majority opinion proceeds from an 
erroneous premise about a "general rule" to be followed in 
habeas cases challenging a sentence enhancement, ante at 
19, 20, and then, as a result, asks the wrong question 
about what relief is appropriate in this particular case.1 I 
conclude that: (1) a "general rule" favoring retrial does not 
exist in subsequent sentence enhancement cases; (2) for 
reasons of prudence and comity, the better alternative in 
this case is to condition our writ only on the 
Commonwealth court's resentencing Coss on his 1990 
conviction; and (3) such a writ would not provide an 
untoward "windfall" to the petitioner. 
 
The majority's discussion of remedy begins with the 
unobjectionable proposition that "[t]he normal relief that we 
grant in habeas corpus is to order that the habeas 
petitioner be freed, subject to the right of society to correct 
in a timely manner the constitutional error through a new 
state proceeding." Ante at 18. I take no issue with this 
statement, nor do I disagree with the majority's assertion 
that, in S 2254 cases, there is a "general rule of permitting 
the state to correct the constitutional infirmity," and that 
this rule extends to subsequent sentence enhancement 
cases as well as other habeas cases. Ante at 19. 
 
However, the majority then makes an unarticulated leap 
of logic that I cannot accept, transforming its general rule 
that the state should be permitted to correct its 
constitutional error into a "general rule" that the state 
should be permitted retrial as the method for this correction 
whenever possible. This latter rule simply does not exist. It 
is true, as the majority observes, that in an ordinary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This "nice" question, see ante at 18, is: "Should we give society, 
here, 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the right to cure the Sixth 
Amendment constitutional defect or should we give the Appellant a free 
ride and have his second sentence declared invalid simply because he is 
a recidivist?" 
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habeas case -- one in which the confinement that gives rise 
to the S 2254 petition stems directly from the conviction 
that is alleged to be deficient -- the writ normally granted 
is a conditional writ allowing the state to retry the 
defendant. This is because, in garden-variety habeas cases, 
the "constitutional infirmity" being complained of lies in the 
conviction being challenged. In contrast, in a situation 
involving an improperly enhanced sentence, it is the latter 
sentence itself that is the basis for our jurisdiction and that 
is the "constitutional infirmity" complained of. See Maleng 
v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (per curiam) (stating that 
a habeas petitioner in an enhancement case is not"in 
custody" on the earlier expired sentence, but rather is "in 
custody" only on the subsequent enhanced sentence); 
Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating 
that we have jurisdiction in a Maleng-type case only 
because the habeas petition is construed as challenging the 
subsequent enhanced sentence rather than the underlying 
conviction, and pointing out that "the purpose of 
[petitioner's] petition is presumably to terminate the 
sentence he is presently serving"). Accordingly, while I agree 
that we should "permit the state to correct the 
constitutional infirmity," I believe that this goal is to be 
accomplished by conditioning our writ on the state's 
resentencing Coss in a manner consistent with the 
knowledge that his 1986 conviction was obtained without 
the effective assistance of counsel. Such a writ, which 
would instruct the state to release Coss unless it 
resentences him in a fashion that accords with our 
determination that the use of the 1986 conviction as a 
sentencing enhancer was improper and rendered his 
sentence unconstitutional, is an exact parallel to the 
conditional writ in an ordinary habeas case, which 
instructs the state to release the petitioner unless it repeats 
the offending process in a way that accords with the 
reviewing court's determination that some aspect of that 
process was constitutionally infirm. 
 
The majority asserts that cases such as Tucker2 and Clark3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). 
 
3. Clark v. Pennsylvania, 892 F.2d 1142 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
                                29 
  
are exceptions to a general rule that the state should be 
permitted retrial whenever possible, even in the sentencing 
enhancement scenario. However, the majority has not been 
able to point to one enhancement case in which a habeas 
court has ordered retrial on the initial charge, or even 
suggested retrial as a potential form of relief. Nowhere in 
the case law is there support for the proposition that Tucker 
was conceived as an exception to a general rule of retrial 
applicable in sentence enhancement cases.4  Although it is 
true that Tucker, unlike the instant case, addresses the use 
of earlier state convictions as invalid enhancements of a 
federal sentence, there is no evidence either in Tucker itself 
or in subsequent cases citing Tucker that Tucker is limited 
to cases arising from S 2255 petitions. The majority quotes 
an excerpt from Tucker as support for the theory that 
Tucker is so limited, see ante at 19 n.13. However, the 
majority has omitted the lines immediately preceding that 
excerpt, which clearly point in the opposite direction. The 
full content of the relevant passage is instructive: 
 
       We need not speculate about whether the outcome of 
       the respondent's 1938 and 1946 prosecutions would 
       necessarily have been different if he had had the help 
       of a lawyer. Such speculation is not only fruitless, but 
       quite beside the point. For the real question here is not 
       whether the results of the Florida and Louisiana 
       proceedings might have been different if the respondent 
       had had counsel, but whether the sentence in the 1953 
       federal case might have been different if the sentencing 
       judge had known that at least two of the respondent's 
       previous convictions had been unconstitutionally 
       obtained. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Cases cited by the majority such as Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 
159, 162 (3d Cir. 1998), which ordered a writ conditioned on retrial, and 
Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1988), which ordered a writ 
conditioned on re-appeal (the relief granted in Barry was re-appeal 
because the violation in question occurred in the appellate proceeding), 
simply do not present the same situation as the instant case; Henderson 
and Barry are not sentence enhancement cases and only involve the 
"garden-variety" habeas scenario. Similarly, the double jeopardy and 
other non-sentence enhancement cases cited by the majority do not 
resolve the question before us. 
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Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447-48. In other words, the relevant 
inquiry is not an inquiry into the prior convictions 
themselves; the Supreme Court's characterization of such 
speculation as being "quite beside the point" suggests that 
the convictions are not the appropriate targets of our relief. 
Rather, as Tucker states, the "real question" is whether the 
result of the sentencing proceeding is suspect. I cannot 
accept the majority's statement that Tucker's import is 
somehow limited to S 2255 petitions. Tucker simply does 
not present itself as an exception to a general rule. Nor has 
our Court's jurisprudence understood Tucker as such.5 
Rather, Tucker appears to reflect a background assumption 
that resentencing -- providing the sentencing court with 
the opportunity to correct the infirm sentence that was 
attacked in the habeas petition -- is the appropriate 
remedy in habeas challenges to sentence enhancements. 
 
Many federal appellate cases, including some of our own, 
support the basic concept that resentencing is the default 
form of relief in habeas challenges to invalid sentence 
enhancements. The law of our Court is actually quite clear 
on this point. In Clark, we held that where a Pennsylvania 
sentencing judge wrongly considered two previous 
Pennsylvania convictions obtained while Clark was a 
juvenile but without appropriate juvenile procedures, the 
appropriate relief on Clark's S 2254 petition challenging the 
enhanced sentence was resentencing on the later, 
wrongfully enhanced charge. See Clark, 892 F.2d at 1143- 
44. In its references to resentencing as the proper remedy, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Third Circuit case law clearly states that Tucker itself is applicable 
beyond the S 2255 context. In Clark, aS 2254 enhancement case, we 
made several references to the fact that Tucker  was the governing 
precedent. See Clark, 892 F.2d at 1144 ("Thus, under the mandate of 
United States v. Tucker, the matter must be remanded for resentencing 
of the 1979 conviction with instruction that the 1974 convictions, 
obtained in violation of Clark's constitutional right to due process, not 
be 
considered in the imposition of the sentence.") (citation omitted); id. at 
1149 n.10 ("The only relief permitted under Tucker is resentencing on 
the subsequent conviction."); id. at 1150 ("Because the 1974 convictions 
were relied upon by the 1980 sentencing court, Clark is entitled to the 
relief provided by Tucker and must be resentenced."). That is, we not 
only afforded resentencing as the relief in a S 2254 case, but also 
explicitly stated that Tucker controls S 2254 as well as S 2255 cases. 
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Clark is replete with language about "mandates" and 
"musts,"6 and refers to resentencing as "[t]he only relief 
permitted under Tucker." Id. at 1149 n.10. The majority's 
efforts to explain Clark away on the basis that the sixteen 
years that had passed since the prior trial made retrial in 
Clark impracticable are unavailing; these arguments would 
be equally applicable to Coss's case, in which retrial would 
require reopening of a simple assault case whose events 
took place nearly fourteen years ago. Other Courts of 
Appeals have apparently assumed resentencing as the relief 
in sentence enhancement cases, and indeed the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically read Tucker's 
holding to extend to S 2254 cases. See, e.g., Crank v. 
Duckworth, 905 F.2d 1090, 1090 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Tucker 
holds that `misinformation of constitutional magnitude' -- 
that is, reliance on an invalid prior conviction-- authorizes 
relief from the current sentence.") (citation omitted);7 
Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that if the challenged prior conviction is indeed 
flawed, the appropriate remedy shall be a remand to the 
Parole Commission for a recomputation of the petitioner's 
parole eligibility on the later offense without consideration 
of the challenged conviction);8see also Smith v. Farley, 25 
F.3d 1363, 1368 n.10 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a 
petitioner challenging a wrongly enhanced sentence would 
not be seeking to set aside his original conviction as 
constitutionally invalid, but would merely be challenging 
"the constitutionality of his conviction as used to enhance 
his present sentence"). In fact, Justice Souter has described 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See, for example, the three excerpts from Clark quoted in note 5 
above. 
 
7. Crank, like the instant case, is aS 2254 petition case in which both 
the prior, allegedly flawed conviction and the subsequent sentence that 
relied on that conviction as an enhancement were state offenses (both 
the initial and subsequent Crank convictions were Indiana state 
convictions). 
 
8. Although Feldman, like Tucker, addresses the use of a flawed previous 
state conviction in a subsequent federal proceeding, nothing in Feldman 
suggests that reaching back to the original conviction would be 
appropriate in any sentence enhancement case. The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that Feldman was "indistinguishable from Maleng," a 
S 2254 case. Feldman, 902 F.2d at 1448. 
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the "uniform appellate case law" in this area as suggesting 
that the wrongly enhanced sentence, not the prior 
conviction, is the target of the habeas petition. See Custis 
v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 512 (1994) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (pointing 
out that the Custis majority's holding "does not disturb 
uniform appellate case law holding that an individual 
serving an enhanced sentence may invoke federal habeas to 
reduce the sentence to the extent it was lengthened by a 
prior unconstitutional conviction"). At the very least, I think 
it clear that the appellate case law dispels any notion of a 
"general rule" favoring retrial on the previous conviction in 
an enhancement case. 
 
I think it equally clear that resentencing is the 
appropriate remedy in this case, for several reasons 
implicating both judicial prudence and comity. First, I am 
not convinced that we even can afford the relief suggested 
by the majority. Having served his entire sentence on the 
original 1986 conviction, Coss clearly is not "in custody" on 
that charge, see Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490, and therefore 
would not have recourse to the remedy of retrial through a 
habeas petition at this point. It is unclear to me that we 
have the power to provide that same relief, the benefits of 
which are unavailable to the petitioner in a habeas petition 
challenging a subsequent enhanced sentence, to the 
respondent in that same petition. I have found no federal 
case that addresses this question,9 and I believe that we 
should not reach out to decide this issue unnecessarily 
when we can instead choose the well-established option of 
simply conditioning our writ on the Commonwealth's 
resentencing Coss on the 1990 conviction. 
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9. A leading treatise on federal habeas procedure notes that Maleng left 
open this very question. See 1 James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal 
Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure S 8.2c, at 333 n.20 (3d ed. 1998) 
("Maleng . . . left open . . . [the] question whether, in the process of 
voiding a current sentence enhanced on the basis of an 
unconstitutionally imposed prior conviction as to which custody has 
terminated, the prior conviction `itself ' may be voided, thus depriving 
it 
of other collateral consequences in addition to its effect on the sentence 
currently being served.") (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493-94). 
 
                         
 
